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Few actions when done quickly are done well – and law-making has certainly never
been one of them. 
Late in the evening of 21 October 2019, the long-awaited, and highly controversial,
European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill (WAB) was published. Despite being
drafted nearly a year ago, the WAB had not been published due to concerns it would
be too controversial.
Voting on the WAB began only 24 hours after its publication, as the Government
pushed the bill quickly through stages of process that would otherwise take days and
should be over months. Late in the evening of the 22nd, the Commons was asked
to approve of a legislative programme which would only have allowed the House
three days to consider, debate and amend a law which is bound to radically alter the
constitutional, political, and economic foundations of the UK. Leaning in to the time
pressure, the Prime Minister staked his political reputation on leaving the UK on 31
October 2019, encouraging EU Leaders not to give any extension to the UK, for no
other reasons than short-term considerations of pure political convenience. 
While the WAB passed its second (of three) readings in the Commons – this
programme was rejected by 322 votes to 308. The House rejected the (reckless)
idea that three days is ample time to process 115 pages of the WAB, with 320
pages of annexes, in addition to 599 pages of the Withdrawal Agreement and 56
pages of the Political Declaration on the future relationship between the UK and
the EU. Having threatened to withdraw the WAB and ‘bring it to election’, the Prime
Minister instead said nothing, pausing the Bill, and allowing the Leader of the House
of Commons to announce that consideration would instead turn to the Queen’s
Speech: the same Queen’s Speech which had previously been so urgent and
important as to require an (unlawful) five week prorogation before returning with little
pomp and less ceremony. 
Necessary Steps and Artificial Pressures to
Withdraw?
Bringing the WA into law through the WAB was a necessary legal step that must
be taken by the UK before the current Article 50 deadline of 31 October, in order
to withdraw on the basis of an agreement rather than on ‘No Deal’ terms. On the
EU side, the WA must be approved by a qualified majority of the European Council,
in addition to gaining the consent of the European Parliament. Even under the
accelerated programme, completing all these stages of ratification before 31 October
2019 would be near impossible. 
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There is an argument that this timeframe for ratification was always an artificial and
merely political construct: the European Council had been sent a request for a three-
month extension of the Brexit Deadline to 31 January 2020, however reluctantly,
by the Prime Minister under the obligation of the ‘Benn’ Act when he was unable
to pass a motion for approval of the modified Withdrawal Agreement by 11pm on
19 October. While any extension must be unanimously agreed by the EU-27, MPs
voted under the knowledge that it was a possibility and that, even while the Prime
Minister ‘would not negotiate’ the terms of extension – he was legally obligated under
the Benn Act to return any offered extension for consideration of the Commons.
Only hours after the rejection of the accelerated programme, the European Council
President, Donald Tusk, mooted the possibility of a ‘flextension’ of three months,
which would automatically expire with the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
The Withdrawal Agreement
The “New” Withdrawal Agreement finalised between UK and EU negotiators was
published on 17 October – allowing only two days for Parliamentarians (along with
legal academics and commentators) to scrutinise its provisions before the House
of Commons was asked to approve it on 19 October. This Agreement is largely the
same as that negotiated by Theresa May, and rejected three times by the Commons,
but for removal of commitments to a level playing field to the Political Declaration
and one crucial modification: the Northern Ireland Protocol. Despite legal statements
on the customs unity of the UK, this Protocol will in practical effect separate Northern
Ireland from the rest of the UK on matters of customs, excise, state aid, in addition to
regulatory regimes and continued EU oversight. 
While headlines (and the ire of the DUP) has focused on the essential creation of a
border in the Irish sea between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (which the Brexit
secretary however failed to notice), the fact that much of the detail and practical
workability of the agreement has been ignored. Much of the detail has not been
clarified – for example, the fact that democratic assent is periodically required and
the functional capacity of an oversight body (not to mention the concomitant lack
of scrutiny on laws while will apply to Northern Ireland without any democratic
representation). The reasoning for this cannot be doubted – not only due to time
constraints, but also likely for the political benefit that obfuscation and uncertainty
can lend – however, even while this defuses the real and pressing danger of
introducing a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, it is a tinderbox of
legal dysfunction and litigation. 
The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill
Despite threats, the WAB was not withdrawn from consideration but merely paused.
The Bill is the only and necessary vehicle to deliver a deal with the EU, and (despite
further threats) the Prime Minister has few options in trying to hasten an early
general election. Under the terms of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, the Prime
Minister must either have the approval of two thirds of the Commons to hold an
early election, or lose a vote of no confidence without the formation of the alternative
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government. While a ‘flextension’ has increased the likelihood of such an early
general election (fought on a split of Johnson’s Deal, No Deal, or No Brexit) to a
near certainty, any ratification of a Withdrawal Agreement necessarily requires
implementing legislation laden with constitutional difficulties and legal uncertainties.
Within 24 hours of its (first) and deliberately late publication, critical concerns
with the content of the WAB were highlighted even as commentators and experts
underlined the impossibility of giving due scrutiny to such a constitutionally
significant document: from the wide scope of legislative power to be delegated to
Ministers; to the relegation and minimalization of Parliament’s role in scrutinising
the Government in both the conduct and completion of the Brexit process. Both of
these issues are immediately at odds with Cherry/Miller (No 2)’s emphatic statement
on the constitutional principles of Parliamentary sovereignty and Parliamentary
accountability. As only two examples: (1) Clause 30 provides for Commons to
approve an extension to negotiation on the future relationship, but does not provide
the Commons to decide whether to have one in the first place (as happened in the
Benn Act) leaving open the possibility of a No Deal Brexit at the end of the transition
period; (2) while the WAB gives power of appointment of the Independent Monitoring
Authority for citizens’ rights to the Minister whose work is to be ‘independently’
monitored (!).
The WAB gives special status to the WA, in addition to the (un)repeal of the
European Communities Act 1972 and the (re)introduction of EU legal obligations
with the obscured acknowledgment that while there will be scrutiny of EU laws
incorporated during the transition period – without EU membership, such scrutiny is
powerless. These are only a few of the issues which raise immediate and the most
serious concerns for legal certainty and democratic accountability. It is foolish to rush
out for the sake of political expediency and electioneering, to the sacrifice of the rule
of law and democratic legitimacy.
… where Legals fear to tread
Politics may prize quick-thinking, but law-making should never prioritise speed over
clarity and careful consideration. Without analysis, scrutiny and impact assessment
we not only risk legal certainty, permanent economic and social damage but also
undermine the core function of Parliament in holding government to account over
throughout the Brexit process. Government is flooding public channels with the
message of ‘Get ready for Brexit’ which is, at best, wilful misunderstanding and, at
worst, disingenuous and intended deception on the complexity of the Brexit process
ahead: this is only the first stage of negotiations. The years ahead will be dominated
by negotiations on the future relationship between the UK and the EU – there are
only days to consider a law and an agreement which will determine the future for a
generation. 
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